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Abstract—This letter assesses the impact of cyber-attacks on 
the control system of the Modular Multilevel Converter (MMC) 
based High-Voltage DC (MMC-HVDC) transmission technology. 
Specifically, the small-signal model of the MMC-HVDC is char-
acterized by a closed-loop matrix and the distance to the 
small-signal instability is then quantified by structured pseudo-
spectrum. Furthermore, a vertical search method is proposed to 
quantify the boundary of the structured pseudospectrum. The 
proposed quantification model with the vertical search method 
can be extended to the control of other power electronics-based 
systems. Case studies on a two-terminal MMC-HVDC system 
verify the effectiveness of the qualification method.  
Index Terms—MMC-HVDC, cyber physical system, pseudo-
spectrum, robust stability, cyberattacks 
I. INTRODUCTION 
ith the development of power electronics and smart grids, 
Modular Multilevel Converter based High Voltage Di-
rect Current transmission systems (MMC-HVDC) have been 
deployed in many countries in recent years to interconnect 
large-scale offshore wind power systems through long distance 
cables [1]-[3]. This is still increasing. 
Nowadays, the control and physical systems are integrated 
with the cyber infrastructure, leading to a cyber-physical sys-
tem (CPS). At the cyber level, the network information of 
monitoring systems and controllers is interacted on embedded 
computers. Meanwhile, at the physical level, physical compo-
nents are controlled to follow signals from the cyber level. Due 
to the increasing dependence on communication, the CPS se-
curity becomes more and more serious. Thus, it requires to fully 
understand potential impact of successful cyberattacks on the 
entire system. To do so, for instance, a Bayesian network- 
based risk assessment method was utilized in [4] to characterize 
the attack propagation and investigate the impact of cyberat-
tacks on the physical system. A zone partition using an anomaly 
detection approach was developed in [5] to detect potential 
cyberattacks. Furthermore, a cooperative stealth cyberattack 
detection strategy was proposed in [6] to effectively observe the 
attacked agents under various possible scenarios by using 
vulnerability factors. An interoperability layer between cyber 
and physical systems was investigated in [7] without the change 
of legacy devices for practical industrial systems. In addition, a 
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testbed with the phase-locked-loop (PLL) techniques was set 
up in [8] to identify undetectable false data injection attacks to 
distributed energy resource controllers. Event-driven resilient 
control strategies were subsequently proposed in [9], [10] to 
mitigate attacks to AC and DC microgrids. 
However, the prior-art research has not quantitatively as-
sessed how cyberattacks will affect the system stability. Thus, 
in this letter, the structured ε-pseudospectrum theory is ex-
tended to quantitatively analyze the impact of cyberattacks on 
the small-signal stability of the MMC-HVDC system. This 
study in this letter serves to innovate solutions to improving the 
performance of power electronics-based power systems in 
terms of anti-cyberattacks. Case studied have validated the 
efficiency of the proposed quantification with a vertical search 
method. 
II. SMALL-SIGNAL MODEL OF MMC-HVDC SYSTEM 
According to [2], for a typical MMC-HVDC system, the 
state-space dynamic model of the MMC power stage can be 
formulated as  
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where Isd and Isq are the AC currents in the synchronous dq 
reference frame;  Usd and Usq are the AC voltages at the point of 
common coupling (PCC) in the dq frame; uc is the voltage of 
the submodule capacitor with its capacitance being C; Idc and 
Udc are the DC current and voltage of MMC; ω is the angular 
frequency of the AC system; Ucd and Ucq are the outputs of the 
MMC control system in the dq frame; Rarm and Larm are the 
resistance and inductance of each bridge arm; Req and Leq are the 
equivalent resistance and inductance with Req = RT/2 + Rarm, Leq 
= LT/2 + Larm in which RT and  LT are the transformer equivalent 
resistance and inductance, respectively; N indicates the number 
of submodules; Ucird, Ucirq are the circulating current suppres-
sion voltages; Icird, Icirq are the circulating currents. 
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The control system consists of vector current controls 
(VCCs), PLLs and circulating current suppression controllers 
(CCSCs). The VCC typically adopts the dq decoupling control 
strategy for the power or voltage with proportional-integral (PI) 
controllers. It should be noted that the proposed method can 
also be applied to other control strategies, such as voltage 
balancing and circulating current suppression control. The 
state-space dynamic model of the control is given as 
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 (3) 
where Isbase and Usbase are the base values of the AC current and 
AC voltage; Tid, Tiq, Tud, and Tuq are the time constants of four 
first-order measurement elements; isdm, isqm, usdm, and usqm are 
the measurement values of Isd, Isq, Usd, and Usq; Sbase and Udcbase 
are the base values of the system capacity and DC voltage; Pref , 
Qref and Udcref are the reference values of active power, reactive 
power and DC voltage, respectively; P=isdmusdm+isqmusqm 
denotes the measured active power; Q=isqmusdm-isdmusqm denotes 
the measured reactive power; xi (i = 1, 2, 3, 4) indicates the 
intermediate control variables, denoting the integral of the i-th 
PI controller's error signals. The reference currents idref and iqref 
are given as  
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in which kpj and kij are the proportional and integral gain of the 
j-th PI controller, respectively. 
The outputs of the MMC control system Ucd and Ucq are the 
dynamic phasors of the fundamental frequency components in 
the dq frame that can be expressed as  
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with Zbase = U 
2 
sbase /Sbase. 
The CCSC contains two PI controllers, the dynamics of 
which can be expressed as 
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with Icirdref and Icirqref being the reference value of the circulating 
current. f1 and f2 indicate the intermediate control variables, 
denoting the integral of the PI controller's error signals 
The output of the CCSC, which is denoted by Ucird and Ucirq, 
can be expressed as 
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in which kpcir and kicir are the proportional and integral gain of 
the PI controllers in the CCSC. 
The dynamic of the PLL can be described as 
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where kppll and kipll are the parameters of the PLL; x5 and xpll are 
the intermediate control variables, denoting the integral of the 
PI controller's error signals in PLL. 
 The outputs of the PLL can be expressed as 
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where ω0 is the angle frequency reference value of AC system; 
θ is the phase signal park transforms. 
The AC system is modelled by a resistance-inductance series 
circuit with an ideal AC voltage source. The AC voltage at PCC 
satisfies the following differential equations: 
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where Ued and Ueq are the voltages of an ideal AC voltage 
source in the dq frame; Rac and Lac are the equivalent AC re-
sistance and inductance, respectively. 
The DC system can be represented by a resistance inductance 
series circuit as 
 dc dc1 dc2 d dc
d d d
d
d
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in which Udc1 and Udc2 are the DC voltages at each end of the 
DC line; Rd and Ld are the equivalent resistance and inductance, 
respectively. 
The above small-signal models of a typical MMC-HVDC 
system can be formulated in a compact way as 
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in which x ∈ ℝn, u ∈ ℝp, y ∈ ℝq, xc ∈ ℝm, uc ∈ ℝq, and yc ∈ ℝp 
are the system state vector, the control input vector, the output 
vector, the control state vector, the stabilizing signal vector and 
the controller output vector, respectively; A ∈ ℝn×n, B ∈ ℝn×p, 
and C ∈ ℝq× n are the coefficient matrices of the power systems; 
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which leads to the closed-loop matrix:  
=cl a a aA A B KC                                 (15) 
Accordingly, the system is stable if and only if all the ei-
genvalues of the closed-loop matrix Acl lie in the open left-half 
plane of the complex plane; otherwise, it is unstable. Denote the 
unstable region to be ℂb and its boundary to be ∂ℂb.  
Since the control system (including parameters, topology, 
etc.) is attacked by any type of cyberattacks, the gain matrix K 
in (15) will be disturbed to be K ̄ = K + ∆, where the attack matrix 
Δ is also an uncertain matrix that can be any value resulted from 
the cyberattacks. Then, we will use the uncertain attack matrix 
Δ to describe the cyberattack. Mathematically, the 2-norm of 
the attack matrix Δ, i.e., ||Δ||2, can be used to quantify the se-
verity from the attack matrix. The closed-loop matrix for the 
system under attacks will become  
= =cl a a a cl a a  A A B KC A B C                      (16) 
A question can then be raised—how large should the attack 
matrix Δ be so that the system may suffer from small-signal 
instabilities? Intuitively, if ||Δ||2 is sufficiently small, the sta-
bility of the system will not be affected (i.e., the eigenvalues of 
A ̄ cl still lie in the open left-half plane). With the increase of ||Δ||2, 
the stability margin decreases. Up to a certain value ||∆||m2  
ax, the 
system becomes unstable. We define the distance from the 
current stable point to unstable status as the distance to insta-
bility subject to attacks with the matrix Δ. This distance will 
strictly characterize the relationship between the 2-norm ||Δ||2 
and the system instability. To calculate this distance, the 
ε-pseudospectrum is introduced. Let ∆̄   = Ba∆Ca be the dis-
turbance matrix of the attack matrix Δ in the closed-loop system 
matrix. The ε-pseudospectrum is defined as 
    : det 0,cl clz z          A A I     (17) 
According to [12] and [13], the definition of the pseudo-
spectrum by (17) can be rewritten as 
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where σmin(∙) is the minimum singular value.  Clearly, the dis-
tance to the instability under the disturbance matrix ∆̄   is the 
largest distance when the attacked system is just on the 
boundary of stability, yielding 
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2
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which means that there is at least one eigenvalue only with an 
imaginary part. Moreover, according to the equivalence be-
tween (17) and (18), we can obtain 
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 It should be noted that the distance to instability under any 
disturbance matrix ∆̄   can be inferred by (20). However, the 
original attack matrix Δ is a control matrix. As a result, the 
distance of the attack matrix Δ should be calculated instead of 
using the disturbance matrix ∆̄ . To achieve so, a structured 
ε-pseudospectrum scheme is proposed to assess the impacts of 
the attack matrix Δ on the system closed-loop matrix Acl. Sim-
ilar to the results in (19), let β(Acl, Ba, Ca) be the structured 
ε-pseudospectrum, and then, we have 
   2, , =inf : ,cl cl a a b       A B C A B C  (21) 
It is further noted that the unstructured ε-pseudospectrum 
boundary from (19) is a special case of (20) with β(Acl, I, I). 
The matrix Acl + Ba∆Ca ∈ ∂ℂb indicates det(iωI – Acl – Ba∆Ca) = 
0. That means, ||v||  0, (iωI – Acl – Ba∆Ca)v = 0. Multiplying 
∆Ca(iωI – Acl)–1 on both sides of the equation yields det(I 
–∆Ca(iωI – Acl) –1 Ba) = 0. Furthermore, according to [13], (21) 
can be reformulated as 
       11max, , = inf = infcl a a a cl ag i       A B C C A I B (22) 
A vertical search method is designed to solve the optimiza-
tion model and find the boundary of the proposed structured 
ε-pseudospectrum. The main flowchart is shown in Table I. 
Given the estimated βj(Acl, Ba, Ca), we can obtain ωj according 
to Theorem 1. Furthermore, ωj is corrected to be ωj+1 and β(Acl, 
Ba, Ca) is gradually updated by βj+1 = (Acl, Ba, Ca) = inf{g(ωj+1)}. 
Note that correcting ωj requires the intersection points on the 
ε-pseudospectrum boundary (i.e., satisfying g(ωj) = βj+1). Since 
the singular value function g(ω) is a continuous function for ω, 
we can split the space ω-g(ω) (a.k.a., ω-β) into several alter-
native intervals. In Fig. 1, the intervals (l jd  
  + 1, u jd 
  + 1), d = 
1,…,mj+1 should be calculated in a way that g(ω)< βj+1 is satis-
fied for  ωd  (l jd   + 1, u 
j
d 
  + 1). Then, ωj is approximately updated 
by a series of points, which are the midpoints of each interval. 
Theorem 1 [13]: Let x and ε be positive real numbers. ε is one 
singular value of Acl – (x + iω)I, if and only if the Hamiltonian 
matrix given in (23) has the imaginary eigenvalue of iω. 
Table I.   The flowchart of the vertical search method. 
Steps 
Input: Given (Acl, Ba, Ca) and the convergence error δ 
Output: Distance to instability β(Acl, Ba, Ca) 
1 Set j←0, Ф0={ω0} with 0 b  and β0←a large number; 
2 while  1 
3     βj+1=min{g(ω):    ω∈Фj }; 
4 
    Compute the eigenvalues of V(0, βj+1) and extract the ei-
genvalues whose real parts are close enough to 0, such that 
 +1+1 0 1, ,..., jj s    ; 
5     if   Γj+1=[] 
6          Фj+1=[], goto 13; 
7     end 
8 
    Select ω form Γj+1 with g(ω)= βj+1, giving the set of inter-
section points  +10 1= , ,..., jm   ; 
9     if   Ω=[] 
10           Фj+1=[], goto 14; 
11 end 
12 
    Obtain the open intervals  1 1,j jd dl u  for 11,..., jd m  , 
where  1 1,j jd d dl u    ,   1jdg    ; 
13     Calculate  1 1 1 2j j jd du l      for 11,..., jd m  ; 
14      j←j+1; 
15     if   βj-1-βj<δ | Фj=[] 
16           return  βj; 
17     end 
18 end 
 
 4
 ,
H
cl
cl
x
V x
x



 
  
  
I A I
I A I
                      (23) 
Last but not least, the proposed method is conducted under 
the given system parameters and operation points. Certainly, 
the quantification result can be affected by various parameters 
uncertainty or variation of operating points. Thus, the proposed 
method can be utilized for real-time quantification, where the 
metric ||∆||m2 
ax can be calculated at each period even when system 
parameters or operation points are changed. 
III. CASE STUDIES 
The effectiveness of the proposed method is validated 
through simulations on a two-terminal MMC-HVDC trans-
mission system, whose parameters can be found in [14]. The  
test system is depicted in Fig. 2, where the MMC-HVDC sys-
tem comprises two MMC stations (MMC1 and MMC2) and DC 
transmission lines. The control system consists of VCCs, PLLs 
and CCSCs, where PI controllers are designed for each control 
part, as shown in Fig. 3. Note that the MMC can adopt either an 
active/reactive power control mode or a DC voltage/reactive 
power control mode. In the study system, MMC1 adopts the 
active/reactive power control and MMC2 is controlled in the 
DC voltage/reactive power mode. The small-signal model is 
derived for both control systems for the MMC stations shown 
in Fig. 2 (i.e., MMC1 and MMC2). According to the control 
modes adopted for the MMC stations, the small signal model 
with the inputs of the active and reactive power is used for 
MMC1, while MMC2 adopts the small signal model with the 
inputs of the DC voltage and reactive power. 
The feedback gains indicated by K in this letter is derived 
through the linearization of the state space model of the control 
system. Moreover, inserting PI controllers will only increase 
the order of the control system, which, however, does not affect 
the proposed quantification method. The PI parameters are 
designed by an off-line dynamic simulation with a set of typical 
values under various working conditions. The detailed data can 
be found in [14]. The inputs of the MMC control systems con-
sist of two kinds of variables, which can be attacked by the 
cyber-attackers. More specifically, one contains the measure-
ments of electrical variables of the system. The other kind 
contains the reference values of the control demands. That is, 
the VCC of each MMC adopts the dq decoupling control 
strategy for powers or voltages. The CCSC suppresses the 
circulating current by providing the circulating current sup-
pression voltages to the bridge arms of the MMC. The outputs 
of the VCC are the dynamic phasors of the fundamental fre-
quency components in the dq frame. The output of the PLL is 
the phase signal park transforms. The output of the CCSC is the 
circulating current suppression voltage.  
Using the proposed quantification method, the distance to 
instability is found to be 0.9456 for the current operating point 
in presence of cyberattacks. To verify the calculated result from 
the statistical perspective, another two distances are selected as 
0.93 and 0.95 for comparison. Choosing 10000 samples with 
random attack matrices for the control system, the distribution 
of eigenvalues under different cyber-attacks is depicted in Fig. 
4. It can be observed in Fig. 4 that if the distance to instability is 
0.93 (smaller than 0.9456), the maximum real part of eigen-
values is – 0.73, which suggests that the system is always stable 
for any attacks. By contrast, if the distance to instability is 0.95 
(larger than 0.9456), the maximum real part of eigenvalues is 
+1j
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Fig. 1.    Intervals in the space of ω-g(ω). 
 
DC Lines
PLL 1 VCC 1 CCSC 1 CCSC 2 VCC 2 PLL 2
AC 
System1
AC 
System2
Usd1, Usq1
Isd1, Isq1
U
cd
1,
 U
cq
1
usqm1
Udc1, Idc Udc2, Idc
MMC 1 MMC 2
U
ci
rd
1,
 U
ci
rq
1
I c
ir
d
1,
 I
ci
rq
1
usqm2
I c
ir
d
2,
 I
ci
rq
2
Isd2, Isq2
Usd2, Usq2
ω2ω1
θ1 θ2
Attack Attack
Control System 1 Control System 2
T2T1
M M C 1 M M C 2
DC line
M M C - H V D C  s y s t e m
U
ci
rd
2,
 U
ci
rq
2
U
cd
2,
 U
cq
2
 
Fig. 2.  System diagram of the two-terminal MMC-HVDC system. 
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Fig. 3. Details of the control system for the MMC-HVDC in Fig. 2: 
(a) vector current control, (b) phase-locked loop, and (c) circulating 
current suppression control.  
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0.02, which implies that the system may lose the stability under 
certain attacks. If the distance to instability is 0.9456, the 
maximum real part of eigenvalues is nearly zero, which indi-
cates that the system is stable for almost all the attacks except 
for specific attacks that may lead to the critical stability. 
Finally, the boundary of the structured pseudospectrum un-
der different scales is shown in Fig. 5. The pseudospectrum 
boundary is around the eigenvalues of the un-attacked matrix 
(see the left sub-figure). Focusing on the rightmost two eigen-
values, the pseudospectrum boundary is plotted with distance to 
be [0.9, 1.0]. It can be found that when the distance is small, the 
entire circle lies in the open left-half plane. With the increase of 
the distance, the circle for the rightmost eigenvalue approaches 
to the right-half plane, leading to system instability. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
In this letter, a structured pseudospectrum and a vertical 
search method are proposed to quantify the small-signal sta-
bility margin subject to cyberattacks on the MMC-HVDC 
control system. Simulation results carried out on a practical test 
system have demonstrated that the proposed method can quan-
titatively characterize the impact of the cyberattacks on the 
system small-signal stability by attack matrices. Increasing the 
distance to instability of attack matrices, the rightmost eigen-
values of the control system approaches to the right-half plane 
and the system becomes more instable. The proposed method 
can provide insights for the development of anti-cyberattacks 
strategies for power electronics-based power systems. 
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Fig. 5. Boundary of the structured pseudospectrum under two scales. 
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Fig. 4. Distribution of eigenvalues under different cyberattacks for the control system: (a) distance to instability is 0.93, (b) distance to instability 
is 0.9456, and (c) distance to instability is 0.95. 
